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ism's most important philosopher. This essay could be assigned to under-
graduates in a course on medieval Jewish philosophy, but more advanced 
students will learn something from it as well. Also worthy of mention are 
Sarah Pessin's discussion of Jewish Neoplatonism and Charles Manekin's 
treatment of Gerson ides, both of which also manage to speak to a wide range 
of readers. In both these essays, the authors have been careful to explain 
basic concepts while also offering advanced insights into their material. 
However, some of the essays are not really introductory. Thus, for instance, 
Joel Kramer's essay on the Islamic context of medieval Jewish philosophy is 
a valuable piece, but it assumes too many concepts for it to be of use to those 
not already familiar with Greek philosophy. 
To some extent, the problem being raised here reflects the ambiguity in 
the term 'companion' in the book's title. What exactly is a 'companion'? Is it 
truly introductory as Frank and Leaman claim? Or is it meant to 'accompany' 
the student who already has significant grounding in the field? In truth, this 
ambiguity plagues a number of other volumes in the Cambridge Companion 
sei;es, which contain essays written for a variety of levels with no clear 
indication of who the audience is. 
Still, despite this difficulty, Frank and Leaman's volume is a superb effort 
and is highly recommended for students and scholars alike. It will certainly 
become one of the standard reference works in the field. 
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This volume is a revised set oflectures recently given by Frankfurt. Its three 
chapters develop and elaborate several familiar Frankfurtian themes, in-
cluding work on caring, loving, and the importance of our overall volitional 
structure as reflective, willing agents. These themes are discussed in the 
larger context of their contribution to our leading meaningful, fulfilled lives. 
In the first chapter, 'The Question: "How Should We Live"', Frankfurt (as 
in previous work) distinguishes between mere desiring and caring. He treats 
caring about x as involving an enduring, reflective endorsement of and 
commitment to a lower-order desire for x. Frankfurt suggests that we often 
simply find ourselves caring about certain objects (perhaps due to human 
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nature), and that such caring need not be a response to perceived value in 
the objects. That is, what we care about is often not chosen voluntarily; we 
instead find ourselves caring about certain objects (consider a parent's love 
for her child). More broadly, Frankfurt argues that there are no independent 
criteria by which we can answer the question of how we should live in a 
non-circular fashion (roughly as in order to establish the criteria by which 
we'd evaluate this question, we would already need to have determined how 
we should live - otherwise, on what basis would we choose the criteria?). As 
such, we will need to look elsewhere - and especially to what we do in fact 
value and care about- in order to evaluate how we should live. 
Chapter Two, 'On Love, and Its Reasons', is devoted to characterizing a 
particular form oflove (itself a type of caring), one that Frankfurt believes is 
essential to leading a unified, meaningful 1ife. His paradigm example is again 
a parent's love for her child, though he suggests we could have such a love 
for abstract ideals (a love of truth, for example), a religious tradition, and so 
on. This love is marked by several features, including not being directly under 
our voluntary control (we cannot simply choose to love - or not - in this 
way), with a concern for the beloved (and its well-being) for its own sake, and 
involving an identification with the beloved - taking on the interests of the 
beloved as our own. These are deep, enduring concerns that provide a 
framework for our lives. They provide us with final ends or goals, and we can 
shape our other desires, projects, and cares around them. Frankfurt again 
stresses that often we will simply find ourselves with such loves, but that 
they are no worse off for not being voluntarily or rationally chosen; instead, 
they are part of who we are as humans. Do we really need arguments to justify 
a parent's love for her child? It is thus against the backdrop of these 
foundational, often instinctual loves that we, as individuals, can properly 
balance our other values, desires, and projects (and not via some abstract set 
of 'objective' criteria about what constitutes a proper balancing for a good 
life). 
Finally, the third chapter, 'The Dear Self, focuses on self-love, and argues 
that such love (properly understood) is in fact a significant accomplishment. 
Love of oneself is a form of caring about oneself, one's desires, cares, and loves . 
Frankfurt argues plausibly that self-love is a particularly pure form oflove; 
after all, the lover's identification with the beloved is extensive and unforced, 
the lover desires the well-being of the beloved non-instrumentally, and so 
forth. Self-love also crucially involves a desire to love - that is, since loving 
gives a foundation and meaning to our lives, to the extent that we love 
ourselves (and thus desire our own well-being), we will want to love. Further, 
to the extent that we are conflicted about what to love, or how to weigh our 
cares and loves, to that extent we are not wholehearted; our will is divided and 
can undermine itself. Such a lack of wholeheartedness impedes our ability to 
love ourselves, because we cannot fully embrace and endorse our loves. Thus 
a certain confidence in what we love, and having a unified will whereby we 
have clear endorsements of our loves, is an important component of self-love. 
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Frankfurt's discussion is generally quite lucid, and many of his proposals 
are plausible and insightful. Still, questions can be raised, particularly about 
the value of self-love and whole-heartedness. For example, Frankfurt is 
careful to stress that a wholehearted person need not be a fanatic; one may 
endorse one's loves while still giving attention to reasons to change them. 
But notice that while a wholehearted person isn't necessarily a fanatic, 
wholeheartedness and fanaticism are entirely compatible on Fraknfurt's 
view. A religious zealot who loves his religion, refuses to listen to others, and 
thus avoids self-doubt or any hesitancy would seem to be ful ly wholehearted, 
which in turn means that he would fully love himself, and that his life would 
be meaningful. This might seem plausible with respect to wholeheartedness 
- but would such a life necessarily reflect self-love? Would it necessarily be 
meaningful (and not merely focused)? These seem to be open questions. 
Continuing in the same vein, couldn't a desire to question (and a con-e-
sponding restraint) reflect a strong self-love, with a concern to find what is 
truly best for oneself - to improve and refine oneself? Moreover, there seem 
to be no limits on the objects oflove. One could love counting blades of grass, 
refuse to reflect, endorse only this love, and thereby lead a wholehearted, 
meaningful life. While such a person might be focused, and perhaps content, 
it will strike many as implausible to suggest that such a life is meaningful. 
To the extent that wholeheartedness is compatible with (and indeed, seems 
easiest to attain via) a lack of reflection and instead a blind endorsement and 
acceptance of what. one loves, it seems open to question as an ideal. 
While at points more detailed argument and explanation would be wel-
come, the book's significant strengths lie in the insights and proposals 
articulated by Frankfurt. Written by a leading philosopher in the field, The 
Reasons of Love is a thought-provoking work that should appeal to those 
interested in love, practical reasoning, and questions concerning the good 
life, broadly construed. 
Jason Kawall 
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